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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to look' at the
relationships between moral philosophy classifications
and elements of risk^

which in turn affect overall

decision-making processes. Specifically, two moral
philosophy classifications were examined: utilitarian and

egoism. Elements of risk (e.g., perceived risk, and risk
propensity) were analyzed in association with the moral
philosophy classifications. It was proposed that

utilitarians would make decisions,.which were consequence
driven, and that represented the greater overall good.
Egoists were predicted to make decisions, which were also

consequence driven, yet doing so in order to benefit
their own needs, regardless of a greater purpose. Data

were collected using a moral philosophy questionnaire

where participants read scenarios related to. ethical
situations and categorized themselves as one moral

philosophy over another. Participants^ risk perception
and risk propensity ratings were gathered after each
participant read a risk related scenario. A correlation

and several univariate statistical analyses were

conducted to identify significant.differences among the
groups. In general, the results indicated support for a

111

negative relationship between risk perception and risky
decision-making. Furthermore, outcome history was
significantly related to participants' risk propensity
but not related to moral philosophy type.
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CHAPTER

ONE

INTRODUCTION

Moral Philosophy, .
That which is deemed right and which is wrong is a
perpetual debate embedded deep within ethical frameworks
and ultimately individual moral philosophies. Moral
philosophy is commonly, accepted as the premise for

,

certain behavioral choices made as a result of

interp eting life's dilemmas. It is believed that
everyda y circumstances that create ethic.al questions in
us,

as

individuals, . are .'dealt, with or resolved- only,.after

referring

to our own moral philosophy.. Consequently,.it

is likely

that personal moral philosophy will.greatly

infiuen ce. decision-making.
to dete rmine

The focus of this, research, is .

the extent moral philosophy plays in

decision-making..

.

Mg ral

philosophy is defined as an individual's class

of beli efs,
behavic r.

principles, and.ideals regarding, his/her

Identifying an individual's moral philosophy

type is critical when determining.the basis of ethical
decision-making

philosc phies

(Fraedrich & Ferrell, 19921. Moral

can'.be- viewed as types -or camps' in. which

individuals base their reasbning for moral decisions
(Ferrell- & Greshamy, 1985). , I will review both the
tradition and history of moral philosophy. First, I will
describe the development of moral philosophy, and then I
will discuss decision-making.

Emergence of the Two Moral
Philosophies

Moral philosophy is rooted in the early influences
of the great Greek philosophers such as Socrates and
Plato. At that time, the belief in striving for,

materialism' and what may lie in another world was
considered wasted energy. Each contributed to the idea of

living a rational and just life. Thus., the field of moral
philosophy extends back many centuries, yet did not
produce meaningful arguments over different philosophy

types until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
During

.hat time, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, and John

Stuart Mills were in the process of developing,a new
moral p lilosophy, which would eventually be referred to

as utilitarianism and ultimately remain.consequence
driven. Ironically,' Jeremy Bentham.was considered the

father of what was previously viewed as deontology, which
was synonymous with all forms of ethics during this

period and that, which was rule driven. Utilitarianism
would eventually become the opposing view of deontology
(Loudeii, 1994). Bentham's final definition outlines the
beginni ng of utilitarianism as it is recognized today. In

spite of the fact that Hume and Mills contributed to the
rise of Utilitarianism, .Bentham .was the prime mover in.
establishing its foundation: and what will later be
referred to as teleology.
'

..

i

.

. I

.

.

'

'

.

Deontology as One Category of
Moral Philosophy

Moral philosophy is viewed as an abstract gathering
of beliefs that is' conveniently-compartmentalized into

two 'categories: Teleology and Deontology. Deontology Is

the rnorjal philosophy , category^ which states that rules
and prolcesses primarily guide one's, decision-making
b.ehavl.ors

Deontology emphasizes "'Intentions or methods

of a particular behavior rather than the end results''
(Fraedrlch &, Ferrell/ 1992, p. ■246) . , In other words, ^ the

deontologlcal , approach Is more concerned with the means
rather than the ends In terms of decision-making.
•

. Deontology is, one of two categories In which all '■

current

moral philosophy literature falls. Although ,

deontol sgy

Is one moral philosophy type that encompasses

3

a,portion of the. moral philosophy literature^ it will not

be thoroughly investigated here since individuals in
general tend to place greater emphasis on decision
outcomes rather than decision processes. For/example^

managers are typically more, concerned about whether a

project was completed successfully.as requested rather
than if it was processed one way. and not another.

I

^

'/ '

'

Emergence of Teleology

Bentham was a British Empiricist who was primarily

compell'pd to change the . current legal methods used to,

handle Criminals. He recommended a system that would deal
with criminals based on the, level of injury imposed on

the vicj:im and,.society. Bentham believed the punishment
or, consequence should match the crime; the punishment

should not be greater or less than the crime (Beauchamp &

Bowie^ i979). His views emerged from, hedonistic ideology
(only that which is pleasurable is good and that which is
not pleasurable is to be avoided)

Pluralistic

utilitarians (one category of teleology) did not bel.ieve
that we only seek physical pleasure while attempting to
avoid pain. Pluralistic utilitarians took the hedonistic
view a step further by demonstrating that other concerns

such as friendship, courage., knowledge, and health are,
all internal values worthy' of attention—not simply

physical pleasure.
. In the late nineteenth century, a pluralistic

utilitarian, Frledrlch. Paulsen, wrote a philosophical
text that outlined a pattern of.beliefs that would, stand

unchallenged for at least 40 years. Paulsen^s text
centered on the "'result-based'^

theories of moral

obligation and duty. .His thrust for a view focusing on

consequbnce became the field of moral philosophy known as
teleology (Louden, 19-94).

Teleology

As previously mentioned, moral philosophy Is

.

typically divided Into two principal categories.
Teleology Is the second of two moral philosophies, which

Is a philosophy categorized as a moral outcome of

,

behavior or a direction toward a goal. Teleology can be
further

divided Into two clas.slflcatlons--utllltarlan. and.

egoist. In essence, one with a utilitarian'teleologlcal
philoso

will Identify, a situation and make a decision

for the

common good' of.many. The utilitarian believes In

• 5

making decisions while considering tKe outcome of that
decisidn, and its consequences, on the whple.

Carlson and Kacmar (1997) stated that utilitarianism
is a doctrine that maintains that what is useful is good
and.-the determining consideration of right conduct should
be the usefulness of its consequences. In other words,
the;consequences should maximize benefits while
minimizing loss. The second classification of teleology
is egoism. The,egoist is doing what is best in terms of

satisfying individual needs. In other words, the egoist

will typically make decisions for the greatest good for
him or herself (Ferrell & Gresham, 1995).

Egoism is,defined,as rightness in terms, ofrthe, ,
consequences for the individual. It postulates , that one.
should .dhoose actions that result in the maximum amount

of. good for oneself. The beliefs of the.egoist. can be

concisely stated, as follows: .^'Do, the act. that.promotes
the greatest good for oneself" (Rosen 1978, p. .38).

The, disbinction between philosophy .types is not yet.
clear.enough for the establishment of definitive

terminology. Researchers continue, to explain teleological,'
and deontological philosophy, types, in similar and

contradictory ways using conflicting'terminology. .An

overlap ■exists between the two fields because of this
confusi on

in,- terminblogy,. The difficulty lies in the fact

that both,fields claim support for their positions, which

merely exacerbates this problem. Thus, since there
continues to be confusion between .terminologies,, I will;
state the definitions of moral philosophy and their
classifications I will use throughout this paper.
Moral philosophy is clearly agreed to be a
cbllection of beliefs, values, .and principles that affect

an individual's path, of behavior. This path of behavior

is molded by many factors (e.g. , the environment and
social issues, family influences, innate
■

, !

, ■

■

' ;

■

■

,•

, ■ ■

■ -

pre-dispositions, and peer pressure) . It is understood

that moral philosophy consists of two primary views. My

■ I' .

■ '

'

definition of deontology refers to an adherence to a

belief based on some procedure or mechanism toward some

end, which leads to, the acceptance of that belief. . In,
other- words,' the deontologist ."beli-eves all actions should
be reviewed according to the procedures that define the :
action. For -example, an individual will determine the

rightness of a decision made based, on the means used to
make that determination. Conversely,

for the purposes of

this stpdy, teleology (the moral philosophy category of

interest) refers to an adherence to a belief based on

some ultimate objective, outcome, or purpose toward some
end, which - leads.to the acceptance of that belief. In

other wjords, the teleologist believes actions should be
reviewe'd, according to their payoff. For example, an

organiz|ation will likely determine the value of a
decision made regarding an investment in terms of a new
process based on the outcome or payoff of that

investment. Next, the classifications of teleology will
be defined.

Classifications are sub-types of moral philosophies.
These -sub-types consist of components (e.g.,
utilitarianism, egoism, and rule deontology)which
comprise deontology, and teleology. Although deontology
i

^

'

.

.

•

will not be thoroughly investigated here^ it will be
included as a.measurement point later on for the sake of

completeness when presenting the results. Since teleology
is the moral philosophy 'of interest^ I will define
utilitarianism and,egoism^ since these are the primary

classifications that fall under teleology. Utilitarianism
holds that the outcome or payoff, of a situation

(decisibn) is critical.when determining the rightness of
that situation. Additionally, the utilitarian is

concerned with the Outcome, or payoff, benefiting .as many
individuals as possible

While egoism also .holds the

ideal that the.Tightness,of a. situation (decision) is .

determined by the outcome, the egoist is only concerned,'
with the outcome in as much as it benefits himor

her.

As noted, definitiohs of moral philosophy have'been

less thja.n .definitive. So'too, • the measurementiof • moral.
I

.

^ .

'.

philosqphy will require reserved consideration. Now, I
will ex plain

the method that will be used to.measure'. ah

Individ ual's

moral philosophy type and classification. .

I 'M

Moral Philosophy

rKoh.lberg created av.widely 'known theory of moral ' .

re.asoni|ng based on levels of one's development. The
i

.

,

,

Defining Issues Test (DXT) was developed as a
multiple-choice test to measure the elements of

Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning (Rest, 1974). The
focus here Is on the Moral Content Test (MOT), which was

.developed for use .with lirtoral philosophy theory. The Moral

Conterit Test was a :derivative of the DIT. Boyce and
Jensen (19.78) created the MOT to measure the content of

moral thought, .it consists of a. sequence of moral.

dilemmas. The participant reads the dilemma and decides

the most suitable decision related to the situation's

morality.

will use the MCT to assess participants' responses
to questions regarding philosophy types and to classify

participants as .either egoists or utilitarians. Jensen
and Boyce's test is believed to contain every form of
moral judgement. The first section distinguishes
teleological characteristics from deontological
characteristics. Within the teleological view is the
i

.

. i -. ,
.
.
distinction between egoism and utilitarianism. The MCT is

a widely recognized measurement tool that reliably
separates individuals into the various morai philosophy
classifications (Wolff & Smithy
Ferrell^ 1992).
.

!

1983; Fraedrich &

,

.

•

'

'

'

A 1981 study by Jensen^ Taylor, and Burton

investigated whether the eight variabies described in the

MOT (e.g., non-hedonistic egoism, rule deontology, and
• I
i

'

■. .

act utilitarianism)

■
,

'
•

■
■

■

■

■

.

could be compiled into a few factors

and still be sensitive enough to distinguish the
variables from each other. In this study, BYU students

were compared to' loWa. State students using questionnaires

that identified "how people think about social problems"

(p . 616) . The construct validity of'.MCT was supported by
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the results that indicated that BYU scores tended to be

higher [than Iowa State scores on non-hedonistic and rule
oriented items., Support for the prediction of. BYU
students be.ing more non-hedonistic and rule oriented was

made because BYU teachings are typically influenced by
spiritual doctrine in addition to regular instruction.
The MCT showed acceptable reliability. Average
test-retest reliability was .69 after a one-year

interval.. In a short-term (four-week) study a test-retest
reliability coefficient of .75 was attained. ,

Co|nsidering that moral philosophy clearly affects
all choices We make, it is presumed to also affect our
decision-making processes. That said, decision-making
research will be discussed ne,xt since this provides, a

fouridation Of information inevitably needed to understand
moral philosophy and decision-making together.

Decision-Making Research
The classical decisiori,model is considered the

founda.tiori ' of research underlying all decision-making in
behavioral.;' research. The classical model is largely based

on - economic and. statistical theory, which generally '

prescribes and describes decision-making in organizations

11

(Edwards f 1954). The classical,, decision model works on
the.assumption that decisions are rarely made with any

uncertainty. According to Beach (1990) classical theory
alleges to maximize an. outcome through careful .balancing

of costjs and benefits. This theory attempts to use
I

'

'

'

'

'

decision-making as a,catalyst for creating predictable

changes in an organization. ""Overall, this presents a
picture of decision-making managers as protectors of
their organizations^ values and goals rather than as
relentless seekers of maximum profits'' (p. 2).

Additioinally, classical theory states that rarely do
decisions include.several choices simultaneously.
i

.

.

.

'.

Typically, one option is reviewed at a time against.the
present alternative; at this point, a change is made or

the pre sent alternative is kept. Each decision made is

considered a component within one large organizational
agenda,assuming the decision is in the desired direction
while, at the came time, eliminating chance for failure.

Not until the late 1950s, and early 1960s did the

classical' decision model go unchallenged. Some theorist.s
believed that it.was not descriptive enough nor did it

provide enough empirical, support for its ciaim.. During
this time, there were two main alternatives to the

12

classieal theory approach according to the challengers^
Firsts It was stated that classical theory be revised

and/or adjusted such that It becomes a more .
. useful theory
(1.e. ^ more descriptive)

The second option was to

""reject^^ the classical theory completely and begin
I .

,

.

•

seeking a new. theory to explain decision-making processes

(Beach, 1990).
Several alternative decision-making strategies have
come inrto view since the classical theory first emerged.

Unfortunately, most . decision-making theory to date does
not cle'arly outline exact reasoning behind why certain
choices! are made. Despite the'fact that they are
.

i

,

•

partially unsubstantiated or
. .V

i

unfIt"", . Beach (1990)
.

.

,

conflrmp five alternatives to classical theory that many
i

.■

■ ■

■ ■.■

■ ■

theorists believe are worthy of attention. The rationale
for the I'unfltness^j refers, to the fact

that

these

theories provide little In the way of support

for their

claims. Although there are five groups mentioned aS'

alternatives to classical theory^

there appears to be

greater meaning In reviewing some In more detail than
others. The five groups ,are as, follows: social processes,

decisions by objective, mechanical processes, decision'
typology, and confusion In decisions. The first two

13

groups iare the primary groups of interest. The first
group qf theories holds that decision-making is based on
nothing more than that.of social processes. These social
,
1 ; ..
^
;
. \
•
.
••
processes will determine the outcome of the
decision-making procedure (Weick^ 1979). Thus, this group
associates with, the t.eleologist's view of focusing on the
outcome of a decision., rather .than the means to which the

outcome'l was achieved. The second group' of, theories holds
that thje decision-maker is compelled by the decision
choices he/she has to choose from and by the ''objective''
to be achieved. The impact of social processes on
decision-making has not been,fully understood. For the .,

most palrt, individuals .want:to be socially desirable; b.
they want to portray themselves in a favorable light,
(Edwards, . 1957). Thus, these social forces greatly affect

decision-making. The second group is significant because
it refers .to the choices available and the outcome sought

by the decision-maker. In this case,, the. outcome may be.

driving the. intent of the decision-maker,, which may or
may not be, the best' decision for the greatest number of.
people. A third group stresses electronic (.computer) and
mechanical.processes, which view, decisions as "adjustive"

or "compensatory" efforts that provide limited

14

information about the specific decision process that

leads tfo these efforts (Steinhruner, 1974). The fourth
'

^

group "'proposes typologies of different decision

strategies and the variables that define the typology"
(Mintzberg, 1976, p. 246). The fifth group emphasizes
confusion and distraction which surrounds the

decision-making process and how the attributes of this
confusion

contribute to the success or failure of

decision-making (Cohen, 1972).
I

.

,

.

An0ther alternative to classical theory is image
theory. This theory proposes that useful components of

other tpeories^. including classical theory, be expanded
i

,

'.

by highlighting the decision process rather than focusing
on the social aspects that influence decision-making.
This theory states that the decision-maker attains three

specific images that establish the. foundation for an
individual's.decision, knowledge. The first image
represents how an individual's morals and ethics outline

the way a decision should.unfold; the second image, has.to:
do with the. types of.changes wanted by the decision-maker

and the: orgapization .while doing.so under time.
constraints; the third image has to.do with the method of
accomplishing the set goals the decision-maker has in

15

mind and tiie probability for. successfully reaching those,

goals (Beach, 1990). For further understanding of

decision theory, a construct referred to as "framing"
needs to be investigated. Framing is an outgrowth of

image theory, which contributes notably to a greater
understanding of decision-making.

Bejach and Mitchell (1987). speak,of framing as a
useful starting point for decision-making and considered
-'

' i ,■

'

'

•

' :

-

•■ ■

■

■

■' . ■ ■

it the iiogicai' ,extension of image theory. Framing
invoiveiS. a 'portion of the decision^makers.^ principles, ■
values,, and goals and the extent to which these qualities
need to

be accessed. MoreoverV the decision-maker.must .

decide if action is even necessary based on assessment of
the

sit aation

Ka

ineman and Tversky

(197 9 ). play a pivotal role in.

the framing research as they pioneered their prospect

theory, which includes looking at the framing of
decisions . as;: a means to ..understanding ways, and the extent

to. which individuais take risks. Kahneman, and Tversky
have' coiiectiveiy influenced ail decision-making research
after their groundbreaking article entitled Prospect
theory: an analysis of:' decision under, risk. Their article

incorporated ample quantities; of statistical

16

manipul|ations in , order to illustrate how decision-making
is infljuenced by the way a choice is framed regardless, of
the level of risk. In,other words, one's probability for

making a particular.choice over another was largely due

to .the jway an individual views or "frames" a

decisio|n-making situation. Kahneman and Tversky created
I

.

•

:

.

,

and tested many scenarios (e.g.^ gambling^ disease/ gains
. losses^ win/lose^ - etc.) in order to validate their

findings. Next, 1 will briefly discuss one of their
' i

.

'

.

, ,

'

. , .

studies! since .most are. largely recognized by many

successjiye decision-making researchers.,
. According tO' Tversky and Kahneman (1981), the
construct referred to as "'decision frame^' is an

individual's conception of.the acts, outcomes, and

contingencies associated with a particular choice.

Tversky and Kahneman stated that an individual's decision

frame cbuld. change depending upon the individual's
perceived view of the decision frame.. For, example, one's

•likelihjood for- making a p,articular 'Choice ..will change
dependi ng upon how the choices are framed or viewed.
."Ac

ording to Kahneman and Tversky, (1991),

partici pants in a study were told to anticipate the

outbreak of-a.deadly virus that is expected to kill 600

17

people.! Two programs were being developed in order to
!
^
'
1
■/
handle the crisis. The, first option in program one was
such that if,implemented^ it would save 200 lives,

framed

The

sec ond

there

:option in program one was presented such that

w ould

be,, a . o,ne--third chance that all 600 people

would' bie saved and . a two-thirds chance that no one would

be savejd. Seventy-two percent .chose option one.
Individuals' .remain risk averse when decision options are '
framed, such that the gains are perceived to be too worthy

of risk|ing. The first option in program two was framed
such thlat 4 00 people will. die... The second option in
i

■■

■

.

■ I

■

program! two was pres.ented such that there would be a
one-thi|rd chance that no one would die and a two-thirds
chance that all .600 people would die. Seventy-eight.

percent'chose, option two.in this. case. Individuals.
continue

to remain.risk, seekinq when decision frames are

perceived such that ah- alternative•to a negative outcome ,

isi.equivaient.
i

. The 'bottom line^

■■

■■

with respect to the study above^

■

is

that .iridividuals .prefer not to make risky decisions.when
the decisions are framed as choices between types of

gains. . jOne gain is perceived to be too significant to
.i -■■ ■ ■ ' i ' ■

. ' ■

■

'.

■

.

' ■

■

'

risk. Llikewise, individuals prefer to take a risk when

■isV

' ■

decisic ns

are. framed, as choices between types of losses,

Taking a risk in this situation is acceptable since not

taking the . risk ;is pefceived to result in a significant
loss

re gardless.

decisic n-making

next fe w

A

Additional findings in terms of
research will- be discussed briefly in the

paragraphs ..

number of processes have been found to•contribute

to ;Orga nizational decision-making. More specifically/

Nutt„,(1 993) elaborated on.the effective and less than
effecti ve

formulation processes practiced within

organizations today.- The formulation process is a
procedu re^ car.ried but. by a responsible agent (a manager)
that., be gins

by responding to the claims, made by key

people and ends when,an. option or options have been
targeted for. ■development. In essence^, the decision-maker
takes a ..course of action in response to a number of ,

claims by influential people then.evaluates and selects
the best route , for improvement. Nutt

(1993)

assembled

four,, main procedural decision types referred to as

formulation processes in his research. The first process

is /^ idea'^ formulation.. Critical features of this process
include forming an. idea; then the problems are linked to

the idea prior■to. any .decision beipg made. Ironically,
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this px ocess is used more' than any other, yet
demonst rates the least amount of effectiveness. The

process ds "issue" formulation

second

Critical features

includej discovering issues and attempting to find,

soluticjns. Managers typically attempt to reach an
effectiive solution through some form of unstructured
•I • '

^

.'

.•

..

.

analysijs.. This process is used more than other effective
I

.

'

.

processles, but not as often as idea formulation. The

third pjrocess is "objective-directed" formulation. With

this ppocess, a manager will clearly outline their

objectijves and use their objectives to direct a course
for decision-making actions. This process is used about
as often as issue formulation. Finally, process four is
the "refraining" process. With this. formulation of

organizjational decision-making, managers will illustrate
their needs by developing new,and creative standards for
defining,existing and future problems even before

analysis is considered. This process, is surprisingly used
least often,: yet provides managers with the most
effective , results. The , last two processes, demonstrate the

most effective forms of managerial decision-making in
organizations according to Nutt (1993).
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To further effective'decision-making in . ,

organizations, managers must do more than simply base
' h i"
.
'
'
decision-making on trite ^'ideas'' or

"
' . .
issues'^ , that lack

effective problem analysis. Managers will benefit greatly

by outlining'^ objectives'^ toward specific targets which

lead to| better decisions and also to guide them in
defininig problems creatively before conducting analysis
as demonstrated by the ''reframing" process.
Clearly1 there;are multiple factors influencing.
I .

.

,

decision-making

The classical model provides, a good

startinjg point, yet falls short due to lack of empirical
supporti. Other theories, also, provide, useful information
for dedision-makers. Undoubtedly, many contextual factors
(e..g., environment, social processes, organizational
demands,

to the

etc),, including ones the decision-maker brings

situation, will affect the outcome and"

effective.ness of the decision. ,

,

. ,j,. ' :,Decision-ma,king.'typically., consl.sts. of two main

components ;(Zakay, 1984a, ,1984b). First,, "'it is
contingent.on the characteristics of the specific
decision problem.,., as well as on the way it is perceived

by the decision-maker" ' (Zakay,. 1984a, p.. 207,).. In
additio n,,

individuals have : the ability to implement
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multiplje deGision-making strategies while doing so under

differeint circumstances (Einhorn, 1970; Svenson, 197.9) 1
It is dvldentythat multiple factors influence

.

declsldn-maklng.and decision strategy. Knowing that

.declslo|h-maklng Is Influenced,by multiple factors only ;
makes ijt more difficult to uncover. the . exact reasons , why
declslolns are made, The Influence of. moral phllpsophy on.
.decision-making will, be reviewed next. .

Moral Philosophy and
Decision-Making
,
.

.Research

. I

.th
W1

what. Is known thus far about philosophy types,,

it. -Is Ijlkely that decisions made by. the egoist will more
than, likely be accounted .for. by a self-serving bias,. The
egoist Is likely,.. -baaed on. current research, to act on

hls.,or..her behalf' and to do so regardless of the

. consequerices to others. The,^egolst Is clearly .a-

"

self-centered self-serving Individual who Is.■going to

make decisions only to satisfy ..personal needs

disregarding the .audience or level of perceived risk, In

Contrast., the utilitarian recognizes the value of an . .
outcome as long as. the outcome benefits the greater good
without Inferest of personal gain.
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Outcome History

Ma|rketing research continues to show how

decisidn-making processes based on, moral philosophies

relate jto outcomes andgcdnsequences of those decisions.
Organizatiohal, as" well: as indiyidual, characteristics

need .to; be .accounted, for. when determining whether a

decisidn was, made correctly.or not. According to Sitkin
and Pabjlo (■ 19'92) , a variable capable of affecting risk

propens|ity is "outcome' history" . . Outcome, history is the ■
belief ian. individual holds . re.garding' a decision made; in a
previogis, situation and the . outcome of . that decision'

■ i

■ .

■

.

''

.

'

.

■

■

lsucGes|sful or ■unsuccessful) ;. In other' word's, previously

.

i ''

■

., ■

■

,

■

' ■' ' , '

.■

: '

'

■

' succ'ess|ful decisions can dictate , the likelihood ;
'(propenlsity) that a decision-maker will make a type of
.

1

'

■ '

■ ■

' .

■

■ ■■

■

■

,

■

decision in the future. Therefore, the utilitarian, in
this case, 'will likely make-a decision- that .represents
the needs and interests of an.organization. The

Utilitarian has been positively shaped by consequences of
making the "correct" decision in previous situations.

.However, if the utilitarian, has not endured negative
consequences or punishment for a poor decision, then it

is not. jclear whether this individual will actually make
the correct decision when potential risk is low.
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Likewise, the egoist has his/her own agenda set oh
tending to personal needs. The egoist is not as.
interested in the - ramifi.cations, of decision,consequences
as the utilitarian is. Most egoist decision-making

processes are not linked to any form of. consequences
(Bettman, 1973).

.

1

,

.

Risk

Rilsk is operationalized as .a situation (decision)

...

that ihvolves uncertainty of the ,outcome. When a decision

is madej with uncertainty, a gamble is made. Furthermore, .
with uncertainty comes the probability for loss and

wagerihg the cdsts of making a certain decision against
the benefits of making that decision. Thus, high-risk can

be percleived as, making an investment in something which
.

.

.

'

•

.

.

• .

has a high probability for: loss (e.g., a manager hiring:

an emplbyee who is clearly not qualified over one who is

■regardl|ess: ,of rationale) . In this case, the manager may
be taking a risk: of being terminated, .ostracized by ,
co-workers., or losing self-esteem because family and/or
friends learn about the incident. Low-risk can be

perceivjed, as making an investment with, little chance for

loss (e|.g. ,, a manager who hires the. mOst qualified
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applicant). Jackson and Dutton (1988) confirmed that most
forms of xisk 'include one or more of the following:" ,

unexpected outcomes in terms of decision-making, goals which- are more difficult to achieve than normal

.and a

potential range of outcomes, which are less certain.
Teleology and Risk./

Schlenker and Forsyth (1977) describe, teleology as a

judgment of a moral action that is dependent upon the
consequences of that action. Schlenker and Forsyth also
found that teleologists would make different moral

judgments depending upon the situation they are in. One ,
study c:onducted by Schlenker and Forsyth found that
undergiraduate students, categorized as, utilitarian,: were

likely|to make different decision-making processes

,

dependent upon the risk in the situation: (e.g.,

potentially high or low risk situation). Their study
demonsttrated clearly that a utilitarian individual will
tend to take, fewer risks when the chance for loss is
high .,

When examining decision-making and moral philosophy

research, it becomes apparent that the two subject
matters are deeply meshed within each other. As
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,

demonstrated; by Qsborn and Hunt (1974) and Ferrel and .

Greshanj (1985). decision-making tends .to. consist of many
factors .(.e.g

multipie dimensions, processes, and

contingencies).. . Ferrel and Gr.esham (1985) show how

personail characterist.i.cs and busine.ss characteristics.,

affect jdecision-making either directly or indirectly.

Subjectjs basing,their decisions oh previous knowledge, '
beliefd, and val.ues' confirm this finding by how they
interadt with other, individuals when confronted with a

diiemma.

. ;; '

;

.Mdny managers refer to their decisions as being
ethically based. These ethical actions are inseparable ,
from one's moral philosophy as the premise for ethics is.^

founded in one's moral philosophy type. Sherwin (1983)
further investigated and discovered two points of
interest: First.> . -he found that decisions are .iirmly

integrated in;business ethics; second, a company's

ability to reach ^performance objectives", is directly
related;'to the type, of decisions made. The understanding
one: can draw' from this research, is that if the action.s

of an organization's'department'are' successful (e.g.,
astute I personnel' selections);,: then many groups of

individuals may; benefit, such as.:' ■"employees, management,
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. stockhcjiiders^ ,c

society" (Sherwin, 1983,

p. 89)4 Clearly, maintaining an ethical environment,can
prove to be useful for businesses, which is demonstrated,

V I

.

,

by the ifact that greater profits are attainable for all

groups I (e.g., employees, consumers, and society) affected
by a cQmpany's "ethical" environment.

Aistudy conducted by Roldan (1988) examined the

value :cj>,f ,effective' decision-making. It was mentioned that
to generate accurate judgements of others is necessary,

.

but not .sufficient, tor a manager to be considered an ,
ethical' individual.:' Furthermore, Roldan believes - that an

ethical: decision is .driven" by an individual's conscience,

which 'is-"simply' an" inner feeling of -satisfaction ' or
guilt over an action done:or not done" (p. 27). That
said, bhe .conscience might play a larger role in

dehermining whether the best decision will be made. This.
leads us to-the notion- of what truly establishes one's -

-conscience. In this;-case', moral philosophy- type may play

a large- role -.-in determining decision outcome'. Therefore,
we are .directed back to the outcome or consequence as
that- which drives:,an individual to make a certain

decision.- AGCording to Roldan, a manager must demonstrate

that decisions were made ethically in order to establish
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credibility -in others for. doing W'h

is right. The

probleni lies in the fact that a manager's conscience may

not coijrespond to the correct decision. Moral, philosophy
arid pefceived; social risk are constructs not typically
investigated: simultahebusly.' According to Ferrell and

Gres.hani (l^BS.)' and;Rettig ,(1966) "almost no .research has
measured the impact of risk .on an ethical decision

.

related to an individual's moral philosophy" (p. 283).

Thus,' the next topic of interest, social risk, will be
examined to more- fully/define it.

i
.

Risk and■Decision-Making

. :The,construct of risk has: attracted the interest cf

researchers in the business environment for many years.

■:

Specifically, marketing researchers have had a strong
interest in understandihg perceived risk and how it

relates to consumer decision-making (Bauer, I960) .: Risk
is defined as "measurable uncertainty" and can be

operationalized,by the probability of losing some "thing"
(MacCrimmon, 1986) . As illustrated by Bowman- (1982) risk
reflectis the "uncertainty" that is present before one

engages .:in a decision. Risk surrounds any form of
decisidn-making regardless if the outcome is the one:
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desirecj;. According to. Haunschild, Davis-Blake, and
Fichmah (1994) ,risk comes in all sizes. For'example,

acquisition decisions; can be very daunting on the decision-maker■and the organization ■regardless of the
outcome,. In 'this, case, there can be a high level of risk

associated with the decision because of high corporate

visibility, exposed personal■values, .and,how the decisionwill affect others.

■

Certainly',, risk can never be 'completely eliminated

when making decisions. Because society is ever changing,
individuals are going;to perceive the context of each
situation differently than another similar situation. .

This perceived risk may cause individuals to apply a

greater or, lesser.amount of value to a decision that
needs to be made. Additionally, we can postulate that

levels of risk are going to, affect.individual types of
decisions. Decision-makers are going to place a, weight on

a particular decision to be made and proceed- to make that
decision. At . this. , time, it is believed that

for ,a .

utilitari.an. the amount of weighted risk is likely to,

vary. . At. the, same timef

the egoist is not likely to vary

his .werghting of a decision because heOr, she is concerned
about doing what, is right or best for himself.
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Although , the marketing lite'rature has' provided many .
definitions of ■-perceived' risk,, several main risk

components continue,.:to 'be researched, 'MacCrimmon (i 98"6)
•cr'eate'd- three components- of .risk':- 1)
loss, 2) fhe chance of loss, and 3)

the', magnitude of
the exposure to ' loss:.

Out of these components came?the contributions by Jacoby

and Kaplan,,\w

identified six different forms of .risk:

financial, performance, physical, psychological, social,
and the overall measure of .risk. Although the research by

Jacoby and Kaplan does not necessarily claim to provide
knowledge for organizations to. alter an individual's

philosophy, or value system, it. does however support the
notion that psychological and social risk are related to
moral.philosophy. In addition, it was discovered that the
risk components an organization may realistically control
are the financial and,social risks

(Jacoby , & Kaplan,

198 6):

Financial and ..social' risk can be respectively
defined as quantitatively measured risk (.e.g. , dollars:
and supj ectively measured, risk (e . g ,., an individual' s

.

feelinps) . Although types of risk are considered, .

independent' of' -each other, research also includes- a type
referred to as "overall"

risk. This research will not

3'0

emphasize the,.financial or overall risk, but rather

proceeJl, with a deeper understandihg of ^ the perceived
socialirisks that exist for individuals,within
organizations.;

. Interpretation of others' evaluations of us can

significantly affect levels of decision-making. According,

to Frafedrich and ., ,Eerrell (1992) the negative evaluation

by others (e.g., peers or,superiors) can drastically
alter kn individual's method.of future decision-making.

If othkrs have .a negative interpretation .about a
situation or the context in which a decision is. made,: it

is likply that we will adjust the way.our future

decisiion-making procedures take place. For example, if a
manager makes an obviously risky selection decision and a

peer discovers the poor selection decision (e.g.,
high-risk situatidn), the manager is .possibly risking the
lo.ss 'of self-esteem, credibility, or friendship. In

additijon the risk of being alienated or ostracized due . to
a poof decision is enough to.keep many decision-makers
'from deviating from the situational norms. For- example.
It is expected that the;utilitarian, would■definitely make
an 'accurafe decision in the high risk situation for fear,

.of 16s|ing.what can easily be, taken for granted, (e.g. ,
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'

friendkhip, companionship, or trust). At the same time,
it is less clear what .the same utilitarian would do in
the satoe, low risk, situation.

. ; . Research .conducted by Sitkin and Weingart (1.995) has
demonstrated that not only are there direct effects
related to .decision-making behavior, but mediating

effectk that contribute as well to the understanding of

decisipn-making behavior. In addition to risk perception,
risk propensity has been identified.to determine if it
had any significant relation, to.decision-making processes
(thesel terms will be discussed in the next paragraph).
Decisipn rfsk can be viewed.as a construct used to

crassilfy alternatives the decision-maker is confronted - .
with. IFurthermore;, to the extent arp'decision involves

high u|ncertainty, whether in terms of th.e choice among
alterniati'veS .or in terms of totalgindividual
alternatives,-the..decision is considered risky" (Sitkin &
Pablo.,. 1992/ p. 219).

. ..

i

Measurement of Risk

I

Perception and Risk

'

Propensity . . .

E^isk perception and risk propensity are considered
I'

'

-

.

.

.

two colmponents of decision risk. Risk perception is
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-

definejd as : an indiyidual.'s determination , of \a risky
situatiion in terins of tte probability of outcome and

confidtence in the type of perceived outcome. Risk^

.percepition ;can be' assessed by a four-item scale_ developed
by MadCrimmon and.Wehrung (1985) to measure 'the amount of
risk rielat-ed to the decision to be made (alpha ■= .75);. ' ' '

bisk plrdpensity; is"defined as an individual's inciinatioh
to avo'id. or . take risks . ' Propensity has proven- to change
over tiime; therefore, it (can be interpreted as a

develdpmental:' 'p-rc'cess the decision-maker engages in

.

(Bairdl & Thbmnsvtl'PB5:) . Gontrasting literature states-

.that pjropehSity-is ■ a -solid and consistently definable
.attribute (-Wolman, ' 1993( . 'Sitkin and- Weingart attempt to

integr|ateiboth= philosophies to make the point that ,
individuals will adhere to decisions based on many

factors (e •■■g-. , ; current situation or individuals irivolved)-

whiie jother times decisdons may deviate from expected
norms (e • g • / ndt hiring the most, .qualified applicant for
a job)^- hiak. propensity is assessed: by a five-item scale
creatdd for risks, related to business decisions

(alphi = .86) ,: .'
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I .

Hypothesis i

• '

-

,

Ailthough the research linking - social, risk and' moral
philosophy types or classifications is minimal'at best,

Rettigl and Rawson'(1963); Fraedrich : and ; Ferrel (1992)

'

found jthat, risk was considered critiGally related to .
' one's- Iparticipation in ethical or unethical behavior-,

(i.e-.,i'risk is associated with the ethicality of asituatiion),,. A positive evaluation, from others was viewed
to be iimportaht to' utilitarians, providing the outcome of

his orj her decision still affected the greater good.
Partigipants' risk in this study included the possibility

of losing credibility or being perceived in a negative
way from their peers due to: the participant's decision
""
- - I .. . '
,
•
. .
- '
type. - 1 -

Ejerrel and Gresham (1995) fqund that an egoist, like
1 "

•

'

.

'

the ut|ilitarian, would make decisions in terms of the
. 1

-

•

'

consequences of that decision, rather than any rule or

procesls that would guide his or her decision. However,

the egoist:.adhered to making decisions while keeping in
mind -tihe best interest of himself or herself. This

demonetra-tes support, for the notion that level of risk

may ndt necessarily influence the egoist compared to what

is gained in terms of the outcome; again, this
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self-gaining interest is the' driver', for the egoist
regardless of risk.

A|.

; , .

Therefore, it.; .-is hypothesized that the
utilitarian/will be less; likely to engage in a

risky decision in a, perceived high risk ;
situation than in a perceived low risk
situation. ' 1

B.

;

Regardless of risk, an egoist will make a more
risky decision than the utilitarian.

.

Hypothesis 2

lyjoral, philosophy is a fundamental set of standards, ,
belief|s;> ^ and processes connected to our decision-making ,
.behaviiors. There are few criteria for : the egoist to
determine the rightness of a decision except for what the

egoist! believes to be right. The measure for what is

;

assumed: right is referenced, to the egoist's behavior
(Schle|nker &Forsyth, 197:7). By knowing an individual's

moral philosophy classification, one should be better
able to predict a,decision outcome of that individual• In

other Iwords, knowing whether a/person is an egoist or
utilitarian will provide some insight as, to the type of ,

decisions they might make.- Many factors which can
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infludnce social;:-ri'Sk

perceived outcomes, peer

acceptance/rejection, etc.) are virtually limitless. Some
research demonstrates how individuals vary their

percepition . of social risk and their likelihood for making,
a,decision based)oh how the options are viewed or framed

(Kahnelman & Tversky . 1979).

v

' ' ihaf . said, since moral philosophy tends to be more

stabld,compared to levels of perceived risk, it is

hypothesized that.moral, philosophy will be a better
predidtor of outcome than social risk.

I
'

' : ,

Hypothesis 3

dutcome , history is the :belief an individual holds

regarding the e.xtenf to which a previous decision or
situation has lead to a successful or uhsuccessful

outcoiiie. Sitkin and Pablo's study (1992) suggests that

•risk E|rop,ensity.:influ'ences future decision-making as
■determined,.by outcome' history. ' Specifically, as an
■individual acq.uires more s'uccessful decision outcomes, .
' the individual's•risk propensity .increases. Likewise, if

a'h. individual acquires more' unsuccessful decision . . .
outcomes, the individual' s risk propensity decreases.'
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T|;herefore,, it is hypothesized that. a successful
i

i

.

.

;.

'

\ ,

outcome history will increase risk propensity and an

unsucdessful,outcpme history will decrease risk

j

,

/

^

properisity for - making.decisions.t

I

■Hypothesis 4
to Sitkin and Weingart

-■
(1995) , an'

indivijdual is more, likely to avoid a perceived high, risk
situation than a perceived low risk situation because the
,fhreati of losing something is greater in the, high risk

situation. Furthermore, Sitkin and Weingart postulated a

negatiive relationship between high levels of perceived
risk and risky decisions because most individuals.link
risk with negative. outcQmes.

'Therefore, it is hypothesized that risky
decisron-making behaviors will be- negatively associated
with levels of perceived risk.
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CHAPTER TWO- : H

'

C 'METHOD.
^

C'

. ' Partieipa'nts

Data were col-Iected 'by, sa'mpling .one, hundred an'-d

.

- thipty"^nine c-o'llege - students , froiti California State University, San Bernardino and San-Bernardino Valley -

Co.llegd... Parti.cipants .were treated according to Ethical : ^

Principles - of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American
Psychological Association, '1992)-.
.

I '

•

-.Design and Procedure. . -

AI combination of wit.hln and between subjects unlvariate statis-tics were used

One ANCOVA and one

.correlationai analysis were also' oonducted.
-

P

-

ihstruc.t.ed toj read three,)

vignettes, which correspond to moral philosophy types,.
and ,in<|iicate. whether they were.likely to perform a

speGific act (e.g., ethical or non-ethical decision).
■ple.xt partiglP'ahts,,: read .a listing) o

several different

philosophy , type,.sland .chose .one that closely accOun-ted for
the, tyOe ; of, de-cisions they, just made . This concept is
hased On the. d,dea that „most ,individuals fall- withiri a few

different philosophy- types with: an,.'emphasis, that clearly
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i

'

'

'

.

.

.

.

•

, '

-

defines them as either a utilitarian or egoist philosophy

type (Jensen, 1981). The Moral Content Test (MCT) was
developed Specifically to classify an individual's
decision into different moral■■ philosophy classifications.

■ ■Participants were then .asked to read the risky- .
decisipn-making scenario based on Brittian and Sitkin.After;the scenario was read, ■ participants answered

questions pertaining to the risk related questionnaires
(e.g. , decision-making behavior, risk perception, and
risk propensity) , ;

Aidemographic profile.was gathered to identify any
potential differehces among participants in
decision-making. No statistically significant differences
were discovered in the outcome variables with respect to

gender,| ethnicity, age, or school status (see Appendix
■

i

■

B) '. ' I ■

.

'

• , ■ .■ .;., ■■ :■ ■ ' ■

■

•■ ■

■.

Measures '

.- .■

■

' -

•

■

■ ■ „ ■ ■ . ■■ ■

■ ,

An extension of the Brittian and Sitkin (1989)

Carter racing scenario was developed. Their scenario was

effective in determining how participants would respond
to different risk situations with-respect to a racing

scenario. According to Sitkin and Weingart
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(1995)

this

:

scenario' is considered to be "highly realistic" and

"quickly engaging." To more closely align this study with
the practical application of the risk scenario, a

parallel form of the race scenario, was used. This
parallel decision-making scenario was. created, piloted,

and implemented in this study. It was,used as the primary
risk scenario based on the Brittain and .Sitkin race

scenario. The parallel scenario puts the decision-maker

in a risky. Situation such that he orshe must decide to
engage;or not engage a consulting team in a project. This
project may provide an abundance of financial stability
and cohtinuous work; at the same time, it may prove to be

corporate suicide depending on the perception of the risk
involved. The piloted parallel scenario was created to be

more closely aligned with a specific risk scenario within
an organization. This type of decision involves personal

risk, business risk, and physical risk. Risk was
described as follows:. "If you decide to .engage the team,

you ma|y lose the respect of friends, relatives,
associates, and endure physical harm because of your
i

.

I

"

■-

'

,

•

.

■ ■

.

■

•

;

response" Sitkin & Weingart, 1995, p. 180). . A scaled item

questionnaire will be used to measure responses . (see
Appendix^ D) .
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OUtcpme history ;was

using two different

conditions (see Appendices E & I). Within, the scenario/

the .,uniu,ccessful history was. indicated by a, lack of
succesh in previous .risky decision-making behaviors. The
.successful history was indicated, within the scenario by

.

the success of previous.risky decision-making, behaviors.

Participants indicated their likelihood for. engaging the
consulting,team using a percentage between 0 and 100. The

higher I the:percentage applied after reading the .outcome
scenario^, the greater, the'.participants^ likelihood for
engaging the team.;
Two elements were used to categorize participants,

into moral philosophy type. First, a self-administered,
questionnaire consisting of three vignettes was given to

the participants.. Vignettes of, this, type . of context tend

to provide better quality.data-from the participants .

rather [ than .common questions (Alexander & Becker, 1978) ,.
Two diff.erent business type .scenarios and one r
non-business , scena'rio were, administered. In addition,. as

detailed in APPENDIX C, the.dMCT was administered which •

.asks, participants to identify the re.asons for their,
decisions' in the'vignettes (Boyce & Jensen, 1978).
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As noted in Appendix F, a four-item scale was

created by MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1985) and used to
gauge EsartiGipants' risk perception. This scale

determined thetlevel;df perceiyed risk associated with
the decision made' based on; Whether one would engage or

not engage the team in the project. The alpha for the,
items in this scale was .75-..

As noted in Appendix ,Gy the five item scale was

created by Sitkin and Weingart (1995). and used to
identiiy participants' propensity to engage or not engage
the team knowing- the risk- involved in their choice. The

reported alpha for the- items in this scale is .86.
As noted' in Appendix H, a manipulation check of

participants, was' used to' confirm that subjects responded

in the I direction anticipated based on the outcome history
(Sitkip & Weingart, 1995).

j:

Results

Exploratory analyses were conducted before testing

the hypotheses.: The data were screened for normality,
outliers, and data entry.errors. Normality was checked

using tinivariate..statistics to verify that all of the
scalesj conformed-:to the normal curve. The perceived risk
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and risk propensity variables were normally distributed.

The prdbability to- engage the team variable was ,

significantly, skewed,for-the first administration (See
Table 1)1 Two' outliers were revealed after running

bo.x-plots on'the,data. These outliers were significant

departures .from normality'■( z = 2.95 p <. .001) and
therefdre removed from' the data set.

Eich participant received two . scenarios., one in. which' an individual' had been successful in prior projects
and one scenario in: .which an individual had been

,

uhsuccessful. The- order of these- scenarios was
counterbalanced., so that approximately one-half of the
^ ■

i

■

■

.

'

' ■

'

■

■ .

'

.

-.

■ .

■

.'

'

.

participants received the unsuccessful .scenario first;
the other half received the successful.scenario first.

After dach scenario, participants were asked to respond

to a, number of' question's-. The following table provides a

brief gummary of the probability of engaging the team
variable by scenario and order of presentation.
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Table „1.

Descri||tives. for Probability of. Engaging Team
,

I'. .

;

,

N

1

Mean ' SD'' '' Skew, .

i

1®^ Scenario Admin.
. Unsuccessful Scenario-

Successful Scenario

.

,.

71'

70.7

22.4 .

71

7'9.. 0 : .25'.-5

-1.11-*

-.1.56* ;•

. 2""^. Scenario Admin.
Successful Scenario

Unsiiccessful Scenario

.:63

75.2

19.2.

-1.24-

. .63

55.0

32.3

-0.17

Ndte.* z significant at p < 0.001

Participants did not show significant differences in
the ratings they applied after reading the first
scenario. In other words, the difference in ratings for .
the unsuccessful [M = 70.7, Sd = 22.4] and successful
.. .

.

I

, '

[M - 75.2, Sd = 25.5] scenarios was not statistically
I'
. ,
'
.
'

'

significant. Therefore, greater meaning is evident by
reviewing the significant differences in scenarios.that

were ..readi second. ..participants' scores differed
rema.rkabiy.,.:.mOre so/ after reading the seco.nd. scenario.
When tfee successful scenario was read second, .M =79.0
Sd = 3/O and when the unsuccessful scenario was read
second; M= 55.0 Sd = 3.3.,The first administration did .

4 4-

not differ by :success. but did for the secondadminidtration

- ;'

The. manipulation eheck, ddd in fact

provide support for. the nQtion that participahts/ .
likeliliiood for. making a particular decision was

influenced by previQus successful or unsuccessful

de.cisipns during the. 2"'^ administration scenario. Because
there was:no discernable difference between responses to

the key variable,^ probability of. engagement: of\team for
the first scenario, the remainder of the analyses will be

based on.the participants' responses to the second
scenarip.. Descr.iptives and freguencies were computed
next. The tables below illustrate the, means, standard

deviatidns, perGentages :(as needed) of variables to be
used in. the subsequent analyses. , .
.Table
2.

'

Frequencies and Percentages for Moral Philosophy
Classifications

I -

. .Egojist:

- h ':N-

:

tftilitarian- .

'He-dlohiStic Otilitarian
- beolntoTogy 1

Se-l|ected- more than one

,

45

'33 •

Percentages

. , 24.%

27

. - 20%

: -46'

33%

22-

16%

11

7%

^

-

Ejieven participants placed themselves in more than
one moial philosophy classification. Therefore, those

participants' data were not included in the subsequent
analyses. The majority of participants fell in the

Hedonistic Utilitarian moral philosophy classification
(33%). iDeontology, represented the least populated

classiiication with (16%) of the participants falling
into that group. The Egoists and Utilitarians represented
24% and 20% of the population respectively.
Table 3.

Descriptives for Total Perceived Risk
2"^i Scenario

N

Mean

SO

Sudcessful Scenario

61

15.1

6.95'

Unsuccessful Scenario

70

11.-9

4.39

Administration

participants.evaluated the perceived risk variables
using a scale of 1 to 7. The following represents the

type' and direction of scale anchors used in the risk-

pefcep|tion,scale: : 1 = -positive situation to 7 = negative
.situat|ion. The scale includes four variables, which were
summed ;to achieve a total perceived risk- score. Two
variables were recbded prior to calculating the total

score.: .The items of the scale are located in Appendix F.
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Iri terms of the risk propensity scale, participants

responded to each item using a dichotomous rating scale
to determine their risk prbpensity. The following

repre'sdhts .the type of .ahehors used for the variables
within I the risk propensity scale: 1 .= "choose more risky

alternatives.based on the assessment of others on whom

you muit rely" to .2 = "choose less risky alternatives
based dn the assessment-of v others on whom you must rely"
The scale.includes five variables, which, were summed to

achievd a total risk propensity score. The actual scale

is located in .Appendix^ G. The overall combined mean of
the scale- , was . 7 .'46, Sd = 1.24.

. ..i -

Tests - ot Hypotheses-

• The general linear model -was used to determine the

degreeito which moral philosophies and components of risk
influe^tce decision-making. All hypotheses were, examined

using Analysis of variance design (including within and
between, subjects design), ANGOVA, and.correlations to

determine whether support for the hypotheses exists.
Hypotheses la stated that.a utilitarian would be
more likely to avoid risk seeking behaviors when levels
Of perceived risk are high compared to low. The
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utilitarian classification was compared with the

remaining classifications for. both high and low risk

(i.e., I successful/unsuccessful scenario)to test this
hypothesis. There was no interaction between, utilitarians
and all other moral philosophy classifications
F (1, 118) ,= .8.09, p =.482.,- Therefore., hypothesis la.' .was

not supported

However, the second administration

'

indicated the potential for significance between the
utilit.arian classification and the remaining
classifications as demonstrated in. Table' 4..
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Table 4.

Probability of Engaging Team by Moral Philosophy
Classification - 2"*^ Scenario Administration
N

Mean

SD

Egoist

14

80.29

21.85

Utilitarian.

17

Hedonistic Utilitarian

21

Success

Debntologist

31.5.6

67.62

29.25

74.00

30.07

Unsuccessful

Egbist

14.

65.71

•20.98

Utilitarian

17

50.13

20.44

Hedonistic Utilitarian

21

48.14

26.21

7

4 9.29

22.14

Depntologist

Table 4 indicated greater differences between the

egbisticlassification compared to the remaining. ,
■classiiieations., , yet the utilitarian classification ■
showed I ;the griatest V; difference in means from the

.

successful; ?s.ce'nario; and the unsuccessful scenario., Bas.ed

on the I trend within the unsuccessful scenario, the ef fect
size whs reported .(t) = . 021) .
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Moral- philosophy research' supports, the .notion; that
egoists tendtovmake decisions that will benefit

themselves regardless Of whether or not other.s. will
benefill. Additionally, levels . of risk tend hot to

influehce egoists as, much as the degree to which -they
feel.'ttiey could ultimately benefit from the, decision

(Fraedlich & Ferrel> ' 1992)

,

Hypothesis: lb .maintained . that

an egoist would make a more risky decision than a.
utilitarian would regardless „of, risk level. A between

subjects ANOVA, design was-performed to discover if .the
two groups were significantly different. Ratings

indicated non-significant, differences between,egoists and
utilitarians, F (1, 59)1 =1.07, p = .306. .Therefore,
hypothesis lb was not supported. Although, the hypothesis

was hot , supported,, the . extent . to, which the groups differ
in Scores from the successful scenario to the

unsuccessful scenario was in .the-direction predicted ' (see
Table 'Si. ' \

,

i ■. ,

50

;-

Table 5. i

Descriptives for 2"^ Soenario Administration
N

Mean

SD

Egbist

14

81.58

21.85

Utilitarian

16

79.5,0

20.44 .

Egoist

14

65.71

20.98

Utilitarian

16

50.13

20.44

Successful Scenario

Unsuccessful Scenario

Risk research argues that decision outcomes tend to
indicate how extreme the range of potential outcomes can
be. Individuals tend to over emphasize extreme outcomes

when the chance for loss or gain is great (Kahneman &

Tversky, 1979). Moral philosophy is comprised of one's

values) standards, and beliefs, which are qualities that
tend to remain stable over time (Barry, 1979). Hypothesis

2 states .that perceived risk will differ by moral

■philosophy

A between subjects ANCOVA design was

conduc-ted to evaluate perceived risk for .the 2"*^ -Scenario
.Administration,' Ratings indicated, non-significant
differences, F' - ,(3, 121)

-.828,,- p = .481. Therefore,
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hypothesis 2 was not supported. Table 6 below provides a
brief summary.
Table ^

,

Deserlptlves for Moral Phllosbphy and Perceived Risk
^

N

, Mean, ,

Egcplst

32

68.84

Utilitarian

23

53.34

4.80

Hedonistic Utilitarian

45

58.79

4.19

Depntologlst

21

59.50

7.08

SE

2nd Scenario Admin.
,

5.15

■Risk propensity research claims that an Individual's
succesls ■ or lack of ■ success . In making decisions will

greatly. Influence future decision-making (Sltkln & Pablo,
1992) .rHypothesis 3 stated that risk propensity would be

contingent upon the level of previous, outcome success In

declslbn-maklng. "A one-way between subjects ANOVA was
•

i

■'

'

.

,

.

.

'

■

: .

■

computed to discover the effects of outcome history on
risk propensity. As previously stated,, outcome history Is
operationallzed as the extent to which one has been
succesisful ,"or unsuccessful In prior decision-making

behavljors. Ratings Indicated significant differences, for
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■i

:)ndi

the 2 I Scenario" Administration, ,F ( 1, 130) = 8 .44,

p = :OpA r\=: .312. Table 73 below provides a. brief summary.
Table V.

33

■

Descri;^tive's for Risk. Propensity and Outcome History
■

3

, ■ '

N

■

Mean ■

■

SD

Risk Propensity .

' Unsnccessful; Outcome History

02 ; , ■

■ ■Sucdessful ■Outcome History ;

59

' 7 .18
O -BG -

1. 2 I'
1.20

■ Hypothesis -4 ■ stated that 'an inverse relationship
would pxis.t between levels ■•of perceived risk and risky

decisibn-making behaviors. Specifically, risky
decision-making behaviors would be negatively associated

with ijevels of. perceived risk. Correlations wereconducted to determine the strength and direction of

these |two variables. The results did indicate a strong
■-

■ j ' ■ . ■ ■ 3. ,

.3

'

■ . k ' :

negati|ve correlatidn between total perceived, level of
risk a|nd the, probability of making a risky decision
-..767, 1 p^ <3^ .01. h. . ■ ■ ■ ■ . ;

. 3

i; : . ;3

Discussion

. ■

T;his thesis study, examined the relationship between
moral philosophy classifications and components of risk
rel.ati|ve to decision-^making behaviors. Moral philosophy
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is effectively linked to one's reasoning for making a-

particular decision. Moral- philosophy is closely aligned
with the study of ethics or one's standard of behavior-, as
it is the foundation in determining right and wrong. An

individual's own moral philosophy can be interpreted as a

compilation of values: acquired through the learning

process and situational variables (Fraedrich,.1993).
Clearly, risk has. the potential to include many
unknowh outcomes with respect to decision-making. No
decision can be made without some degree of risk or .

potential for loss. Risk research states that individuals
are influenced,by the interpretation of how risky a
decisibn may be. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), discovered,
that.individuals tend to practice risk averse behaviors

when there is great potential for loss. On the other

hand, |subsequent, research claims that prior success in
decisiion-making will increase the probability that one

will ebgage in; risky decision-making behaviors in the
future) (Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, 199:6).
A framework in which moral philosophy
classifications and risk components were developed to

investigate, influences oh current decision-making

proceases. - Furthermore, Utilitarian and ' E.goist moral

-

.:. 5.4

. .

.. .

- s

.-

:

philospphy classifications were examined in conjunction
with one's risk perception and risk propensityi :

.

Several analyses were performed to explore .potential

differ!ences among classifications and risk components.

.Specifically,' a combination of within and between subject

analys|es of variance designs were computed; additionally,
one ANiCOVA was ..computed to .investigate the relationship

.

betweein moral philosophy and perceived risk decision

outcoiries; and finally, a correlation provided data on the
relationship between risk perception and risky decision
making behaviors. The next section discusses the results
of the analyses.

Overall, results provided mixed findings.
Participants falling within the Utilitarian
classification did not demonstrate a likelihood toward

risk avoidance behaviors in situations where high levels

of perceived risk, were present. However, lack of support

for hypothesis la may be influenced by the size of the

sample,. The number of participants.-within the Egoist and

jUtilitarian classification for the ■2"'^ Scenario
Administration was' relatively ; small. When ' the means, were

plotted,..- ;the Utilitarians .did in fact demonstrate the

greatest■likelihood for avoiding risk behaviors when
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perceived risk was highv^ A

analyzing the data,, one

could' speculate that there might be a learning effect

present between the, first and second scenarios for both
countelrbalanced groups. Participants did not indicate.

signiflicant differences after.responding to the first ,
scenario regardless if the first scenario was successful

or unsiuccessful. Again, the manipulation check supported

the aslsumption that individuals are influenced by the
order 'of a successful or unsuccessful previous outcome.

, .

Schlenker and Forsyth (1977) conciuded the following

regarding egoists, "no moral standards can be considered
.valid except those in reference to one's own behavior"

..(p. ,331). From this, one might conclude that an, egoist's decision will likely be made with the intent that he/she
will ,b|enefit,, , in some capacity, from that decision
I
1,

.
" '

. , ,
i

^

' '

.

'
^

^

■regardless of whether others will- benefit. Also, egoists ,
are mqre ■ likely : to change their decisions regardless■of
external influences (e.g. , level of risk)/than any other ■

classification'according, to Fraedrich■and Ferrel (1992) .

Similar to hypothes-is la, :,it- is believed that hypothesis

-lb wag not stati'sticdlly significant primarily due to
samplb size. As scenarios were' counterbalanced and
. analysed according to egoist and utilitarian

■ -i-" ■

■

-
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classifications, the number of participants dropped
considerably. However, when the means were plotted,

egoistis 'did -in fact demonstrate a greater likelihood for
making; a risky rdecision compared to utilitarians. Similar

to. hypothesis la one could speculate that there might be
'

'

.

a'learning effect,present between the first and. second
scenarios for bot.h counterbalanced groups. Egoists and

Utilitiarians did not indicate significant differences^

after ;responding to the. first scenario regardless if the
first Iscenario was successful or unsuccessful. However,
there iwas a noticeable difference, in the groups, after

responding to the second scenario.
Mbral philosophy tends to be based on an
indiviidual's beliefs, values, and standards. It is
"believied that moral philosophy, ns a system of values

which jguides one,'s conduct, is deeply embedded within us;
it is,Icapable of remaining fairly stable over time

(Barry,, 1979). At the same time, levels of risk can va.ry

dependiing upon the individual's perception of the risk
involved. , March, and Shapira, (1987) stated that most
indiviiduals will see identical risk situations in

entirely different ways. Although moral philosophy tends
to be :a more stable variable than risk, hypothesis 2,
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which blaimed that moral philosophy would be a better
predictor of outcome than perceived risk was not

supported..The size of the sample may have played a role
in affleeting the' statistical power of discovering

•significance between moral philosophy and perceived risk.

The egbist:classification demonstrated the possibility

that it could predict outcome better than.perceived risk,
when compared to the remaining classifications. The

.learning,effect -may be present in. this hypothesis as well

since Only the 2-^ Scenario Administration shows trends
for potential.significance.

.

Two main■components of risk in this study include

risk perception and risk propensity. Propensity is still

gaining interest within current risk research. Propensity
asserts that previous performance involving a task,
situation, or "decision" will greatly affect future
tasks, ! situations, or "decisions". In other words,

previous decision Outcomes become the driver of future
.decision-making behaviors. Individuals; are clearly
influenced by the history of success or failure of

previous decisions (Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, . 1996) .

Hypothesis 3 was supported as the results were
statistically significant. Results revealed that risk

58

propenisity .was- contingent upon; the-, level of-, previous
outcomje' success in decision-making. Research. conducted by

Sitkini and.Pablo (1992)' supports this discovery. In- their

study,! they discovered support for individuals taking
more rjisks due to previously successful outcomes. .
.Additiionally, 'individuals were reluctant to take risks
when-ipire-vious outcome histories were unsuccessful.

Ailthough risk perception and decision-making
reseafch tend to run contrary to the foundations of

"prospiect theory", there are consistencies between the.
negatiiVe corre.la.tions discovered in hypothesis 4 of this

study,: and the work performed by Kahneman and Tversky. As
noted iearlier,. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) stated that
individuals tend to be risk averse when the chance for

loss is high regardless of previous success. Hypothesis 4
was supported by the data. High, levels of perceived risk
were alssociated with less risky decisibn-making
behaviidrsw

' ' '

' -

-

Summary

The decision-making research in relation to moral
I

.

-

. '

-

"

1

''

-:

philosiophy and social risk is still burgeoning. The
variabjles that are capable of influencing decision-making
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behavilors are virtually unlimited. Several components of
moral Iphiloeophy were; identified and tested. These
componlents, referred to as classifications (e.g., .
utilitiarianismiand egoism), provided some understanding
-as to the essence of what moral philosophy stands fox. At
the same time, risk research provides a foundation of

understanding, in addition to moral philosophy, that may
shed some light on the variables, which influence,
decision-making behaviors. In particular, this study
lookeci at risk perception and risk propensity as ,

componjents t.hat heavily influence one's interpretation '

One limitation, of the study was the size of the

Limitations of the Study

and likelihood for making a specific decision.

, ,

.

sample. A slightly larger sample size may have , increased
■the power, andv -provided stronger support for many of the

hypotheses. 'Additionally, the'sample consisted of
uni.Yffsity- students only,, which may have played a role in
hinderling t.he robustness of the study. Although most

■

■"researchers tend to .select from a ready-made s.'tudent

■populdtion, additional research may "benefit, f rom
■ including employees-.in, a . non-university setting .'

;60- . :■

ftnoth;,#r- iimitation was not incorporating additional

moral iphilosophy sub-classifications. Research states
that individuals/primarily fall within either the

Teleoiogi.cal or Deontoiogical moral philosophy category.
There are variations of these classifications that might

explain why .individuals make the types of decision they
make. I

: ,A. third limitation of the study may- be linked .:to , the
idea that the. participants had difficulty understanding
the cpntent .and the measures uSed to assess..one's ratings
on thp variables. The:student sample may not have

-acquiied the experience necessary to respond in the most
effectxive . method.- It was determined that a learning trend

or effect was -present in this study from- the 1®^ scenario
administration and the

scenario administration. : ;

A firial -limitation- of this study indicated that participants might not, "in fact, have perceived enough
risk in the- parallel risk scenario. If participants did

..not perceive an extensive amount of risk, it is unlikely
that they -would apply appropriate ratings that would
provi.de meaningful results.
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FOR

.INFORMED CONSENT FOE THE STUDY- ' V l.You '.are Deing asked to participate; in ^a study that

is designed to measure" factors, that affect decision
making. This study- is being ' conducted ' by John V. -Wood
under-the supervision of Dr. Janet Kottke, Professor of

Psychology. "This study has -been approved by the- .
PsychOTogy Department Human Subjects Review Board,
Calif-prnia fState- Univefsity, San Bernardino. This study .

isinino way harmful.to your.emotional health. ,
;

1 am .awalenof- the following conditions

'
. I A. . 1 will read and Complete a- demographic:
j

.

I B-.

. !

questionnaire

y

I will read a s.cen.ario related to risk and

complete the corresponding questionnaire

rC.

I will read a scenario about my previous

j

outcomes related to decision.making
I will read a listing of different moral

Ir
I

philosophy types .and choose the one that most
.closely
fits me

,

All information, that you provide will be held in

eonfl|dence by- the resedrcHers. At no time will your name

be reported with your responses. All data will be
reporited in group form only.
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.. Your participation in this study is completely

voluntary. You may choose to withdraw from this study at

any time without penalty. Any additional questions about
this study should be directed to John V. Wood

(909) 1371-2308 or Dr. Janet Kottke (909) 880-5585.. If you
i

,

'

have dny questions about research subjects' rights

contacbt the University's Institutional Review Board
(909) j 880-5027. By placing a check mark in the space

below) I acknowledge that I have been informed.of, and
understand, the nature and purpose of this study. I

freely consent to participate. I also acknowledge that I
am atileast.18 years of age.

Placeja check mark here:

Today's date:

i do appreciate your voluntary participation,
howevdr you will have the right to withdraw from
i

.

•

-

participating to the research any time. If you have any
I

• '

•

questions regarding the research, you can contact Dr. Jan
Kottke at . (909) 880-5585.. Thank you very, much for your
cooperation., ..

By placing a check mark in.the space below I
acknowledge that I have been informed of, and understand,
the ndture and purpose of this study. I freely Consent to

participate.

I, agree to participate

•

^
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,DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Gender;

Age:

Female

Male

School Status

Freshman
Senior

Sophomore

Junior

Grad Student

Ethnicity:
Asian

African American

Caucasian

Hispanic

Native American

Other
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MORAL PHILOSOPHY QUESTIONNAIRE

Please read the following situations and respond to

the question asked after each situation.
Situation 1

Sherry Smith has recently accepted a job with a

young aggressive retail company. Smith's former retail
employer is rumored to have developed a confidential
in-house software package that is easily used by

managers. When Sherry was hired she was led to believe
her selection was based upon her management potential. On

the morning of her third week. Smith received the

following memo from her superior: "Please meet with me
tomorrow for the purpose of discussing your former
employer's software package."

If you were Smith, what are the chances you would
provide your new employer with the software?

Likely
1

Unlikely
2

3

4

5

6

7

Situation 2

Allan Bartels did some odd jobs for neighbors (i.e.,

painting, building sheds and garages, etc.) and was paid
substantial sums of money. Allan knows that these monies

go unreported. At tax time, Allan considers his options

68

of reporting, the extra■income or not. He knows that the
IRS will never find out about the extra income.

If you were Bartels, what are the chances you would
report the extra income?

Likely
■ ■■ ' ,1

Unlikely
2

Situation 3

,3 ,

4

■ ■

5

6 ..

7

..

Ed Johnson is in charge of market development for

Rollfast Company. In the past, the company has been
barred from entering a market, in a large Asian country by
collusive efforts of the local retail corporations.

Rollfast could expect to net 550 million dollars per year
from sales if it Could penetrate this market. Last week a

businessperson from the country in question contracted Ed
and stated that entry into this market could be had for
an "under-the-table payment of $50,000.

If you, were,Ed Johnson, how likely is it that you
would ipay. the rnoney?

Likely
■

.

i

1■

Unlikely

.

■

2

.

3

• •

.

■ . ' ■

, 4

5 '

■ ■

■

6

■

■

.

7

Place a check on.the line next to the most

appropriate explanation for the three decisions you just
made:
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1)

My decision, whatever it may be, will lead to some
goal for myself (i.e., praise, recognition, money,

keeping my job, power over the system, promotion).

(2)

Sometimes providing information, not reporting extra
income, paying money to get into markets is
beneficial because it leads to more efficient

organizations, greater disposable income, more
competition, etc.

(3)

My decision is based on an evaluation made
independently from rules as they relate to the

|%\ I

consequences of a specific act/decision; the
maximization of pleasure greatly influences my
decision process.

(4)

The wrong and rightness of my decision is in
accordance with the conformity to a set of universal
rules. I do not focus on consequences when

determining wrong or rightness of my decision
strategy.
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RISK SCENARIO

Please read the following scenario carefully
"What should we do?"

John Johnson was not sure, but his brother and

partner, Fred Johnson, was on the phone and needed a
decision. Should they send the team ; of;consultants to,

complete this re-organization project for the state
government? It had been a successful year so far, but the
government re-organization project was important because
of the good press, future business, and money it
promised. The first year had been hard because the team
was trying to make a name for itself. They had completed
a lot of small projects to,get this opportunity with a •

big time government agency. A successful outing could

mean more exposure for the organization, more business,

and more money.. But if the team suffered another failure
while the industry is watching...

Just thinking about the team's problems made John

wince. They had 7 failed projects in the last 24 outings

this year with various degrees of damage to the

organization's reputation. No one could figure out why.
It took'a lot of money to repair the failed project
attempts. John and Fred had everything they owned riding
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on thQ■team's next big project- This one had to be a

'

'

success.:

; , ■ Paul Edwards the expert consultant was; guessing the .

team's-'■prpblem- was. related to one member of the team not

pulling his weight ., P.aul fel.f that' this particular ■
member's, performance was: the ■ culprit. for the team's

decline in.'perf ormance within the last year . ■ Paul :

described 'how -.loa^f

poor; consulting recommendations-

were the . real cau:s:e of: ,the problem by this member.
Tom Burns, the senior expert consultant, did not

agreeIwith, Paul's "gut feeling" and had data to support
his.; position. He pointed out that all members had made
poor .consulting, recommendations at one time or another
that meant it" couldn'/t be just one member . Tom had :

consulted for over 20 years -and, believed that luck was an
vimportant element of success. He had argued this view

.

when he and John discussed the problem last week: "In ;,

consuiting, , you. are pushing the limits of what is known.
You cannot expect to have:everything under control. If
you want to be.the best, you have to take risks.
Everybody in .consulting knows i.t . I have a career that

.depends on the'- 'outcome of every pro j ect. That' s the:
thrill, beating the odds and.succeeding." Last night over

"

ii."
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'.

dinner,he had added to this argument forcefully with what
he called Burns' First Law of Consulting: "Nobody ever .

completed a project successfully by sitting on his/her
butt."

John, Fred and Tom had discussed,the team's up

coming project situation the previous evening. The first

year was a success from a consulting standpoint, with the
team finishing 12 of 15 projects successfully. As a
result, the business and acclaim that comes from the

team's success rate were starting to come in. A big break
had come 2 weeks ago after the Dunham project, where the
team had ranked as one of the four top consulting teams

in the industry. Gladstone industries had finally decided
to hire Johnson Consulting for a smaller project worth a
much needed $400,000. Additionally, Gladstone was
considering using Johnson for a much larger consulting

project worth roughly two million dollars over, the next 3

years providing Johnson completed the government project
successfully. Although internal experts at Gladstone
recommended Johnson Consulting, the larger contract

depended upon the government project outcome.,
"John, we only have another hour to decide," Fred,
said over the telephone. "If we wait to do the project

74

,

for the government, we can keep the money acquired to do
the initial assessment $15,000 and try to recoup some of

our losses next year. We will lose Gladstone, they'll
want $25,000 of their money back, and we end up the year

$50,000 in the hole. If we take the project and finish
successfully, we'll have Gladstone in our pocket and we
can afford an additional consultant next year. You know
as well as I do, however, that if we take the project and

fail, we are back to square one next year. We will lose

our reputation as one of the leading consulting firms in
the industry, which in turn will lead to fewer contracts

in the future. No organization wants to be associated
with a consulting firm that has a failing record. Think
about it—call Paul and Tom if you want—but I need a
decision in an hour.
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DECISION BEHAVIOR

ADMINISTRATION"

Please, read ,the. following additional information
about the scenario and answer the question at the end.
You are John Johnson. You must decide whether to ,

send' your consulting team in to complete the
re-organization project .for the state government. You
need'to make a decision within the hour knowing that
there are certain risks involved. For example, if you

engage your team, there may be some risks involved such
as -business, personal, or financial risks associated with
your decision.

As John Johnson, you have had a moderate amount of

training for and experience with this type of decision.
Your previous decisions have been largely unsuccessful
and , you have always had a nagging worry that your poor
"track record" could eventually have serious

consequences. You feel uncertain because of the lack of
success of those decisions you have made in the past.

What is the probability that you would engage the

team/not engage the team (where 0% = definitely not

engage team and 100% = definitely engage team )?
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RISK PERCEPTION

Please answer the following four items about;the
scenario:

How would you characterize the decision faced by John
Johnson?

(1)

1 = significant opportunity to 7 = significant

. . ;threat : .

;i,i

(2)

1 = potential for loss to ,7 =;potentiai:. for;^^g

(3)

1 = positive situation to 7 = negative situation

What is the likelihood of the consuiting.team

in the project?

(4):

,

I v= very unlikely to. 7 = very, likely

■79:
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RISK PROPENSITY

Please read the following,additional information
about the scenario and answer these five questions:

As John Johnson, you're faced with a decision that

affects your organization's financial future. Given this
circumstance, how', likely are you to... . CPlease answer by

using "likely or unlikely" on the line provided under
each number below; you will need to answer all five

questions in this section, not just one of the five).
(1)

choose more or:less risky alternatives based on the
"assessment of others- on; whom you must- rely

(2)

choose' more or'less risky alternatives, which rely

upon analyses high in , t-'echnical cornplexit-y

':

(3). 'choose more, or less risky alternatives which could

have a major impact on the strategic.direction of
your organization

(4)

: "u

/initiate a strategic corporate action^ whiGh .has the
potential to backfire

(5)

-,

.

support a decision when I was aware that relevant
analyses were done while missing several pieces ofinformation- ,

-i. .
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CHECK

MANIPULATION

CHECK

■Please read-and "answer the following questions about

the previous scenario.

1).

Extent to which problems have resulted from John's
i,decisions like this.in.the past

.■ ,

, ;,■ .Likely :

V

,:l 1^.;i- :2V' ,
2)

; 1'

"-.i

,4

lUnlikely ,

5i'

1 :. -e ;-

7- ■ ;

Degree toi.vih.ich John" has analyzed decisions like
this correctly in ; the past

" Likely.

■ " : ' ■ 1^
3)

Unlikely

: 2. - '

'■ 3 ■ : ;

: A

.5 '

6;

■ . "■

■ ■7 b

" : Degree to which successful outcomes have.resulted . :
from John's.decisions like this in the past

: i'" ^ Likely . ■

: iV- 1 '

■::,■:■

■ ,^

2: ' i " ■ ■ .3- '

"

.

u; ■ 4
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;- ' DECISION BEHAVIOR:;"2®° ADMINISTRATION" . V
: Now, please read the following additional

,

information about the scenario and answer the question:
You are John Johnson. You must decide whether to

send your consulting team in to complete the
re-organizatlon project for the state government. You
need to make, a:decision within the hour knowing that

there are certain risks involved. For example, if you

engage your team, there may:be some risks involved such
as business, personal, or financial risks associated with
your decision.

As John Johnson, you have had a moderate amount of

'

training for and experience with, this type of decision.
Your previous decisions have, been largely successful and

you have always derived a sense of self-assurance from

your successful "track record" in making such decisions..
You feel ■confident because of the success of those'

decisions- 'you . have made in the- past . "

■iWhat islthe probability that you would engage the

team/not-., engage : the team (where 0,% ■= detlnitely ' not •
■engage team and' 100% = definitely engage team) '?"

,

• Please answer the following -four items about the
scenario: .

.%

How would you charaeterize. the .decision faced by
John Johnson?

(1)

1 = significant opportunity to 7 = significant
threat u-

,

(2)

1 = potential.for loss to 7 = potential for gain

|3)

1 ■=. positive situation to 7 =■ negative;,-situation

-What is, the likelihood, of the consulting team-

Succeeding in the,project? ■

(4)

-1 = 'very' unlikely to 7,'= very; likely - - - please read the following :a.dditiona,-l information-

about. the scenario- and answer these - five; 'questions :

, As John Johnson, . you're ■faced with a'decision, that;

affects your organization' s financial:\fut-ure

'Given this

circumstance, how likely are ;you to... (Please answer hy

using "likely or unlikely" on the line provided under
each number below; you will need to answer all five

questions in this section, not just one of the five)

(1)

choose, more or less risky alternatives based, on the.
assessment of others on whom,you must rely
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(2)

choose more or less risky, alternatives, which rely

upon analyses high in technical complexity
(3) ' choose more or less- risky alternatives which could
have a major impact on the strategic direction of
your organization

^

.

(4) . initiate a strategic corporate action which has the
potential-to backfire'
(-5)

support, a decision when I was aware that relevant
analyses were done while missing several pieces of
information

•

Please read, and answer the following questions about

the previous scenario.

1)

Extent to which problems have resulted from John's
decisions like this in the past

Likely
1

2)

Unlikely
2

.3

.

4

5

6

7

Degree to which John has analyzed decisions like
this correctly in the past

Likely
1

3) .

Unlikely
2

3

4

5

6

7

Degree to which successful outcomes have resulted
from John's decisions like this in the past

Likely
1

Unlikely
2

3

4.
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